This correspondence derives bounds on the jamming capacity of a slotted ALOHA system. A system with n legitimate users, each with a Bernoulli arrival process is considered. Packets are temporarily stored at the corresponding user queues, and a slotted ALOHA strategy is used for packet transmissions over the shared channel. The scenario considered is that of a pair of illegitimate users that jam legitimate transmissions in order to communicate over the slotted ALOHA channel. Jamming leads to binary signaling between the illegitimate users, with packet collisions due to legitimate users treated as (multiplicative) noise in this channel. Further, the queueing dynamics at the legitimate users stochastically couples the jamming strategy used by the illegitimate users and the channel evolution. By considering various independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) jamming strategies, achievable jamming rates over the slotted ALOHA channel are derived. Further, an upper bound on the jamming capacity over the class of all ergodic jamming policies is derived. These bounds are shown to be tight in the limit where the offered system load approaches unity.
Continuing this recursion, we can express X i+k as a function ofi01 (35) Thus X i+k becomes the sum of two independent zero mean terms, sinceXj; 8j i is independent of the noise realizations up to time i 0 1, see (5) . We know that X i = i01 ( 0 i01 ): 
Since the second term on RHS is zero E[X i X i+k ] = 2 k : (38) Note that (38) represents the covariance matrix of a wide sense stationary process. However, we are considering the truncated input sequence, i.e., for all channel uses i 2, to obtain this Toeplitz structure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A typical slotted ALOHA system comprises of a collection of legitimate users following a prearranged strategy to gain access to resources and communicate with each other. Our correspondence focuses on using jamming as an unconventional communication mechanism to achieve a nonzero throughput in a slotted ALOHA system. In this mechanism, an illegitimate jamming transmitter that has gained entry into a slotted ALOHA system jams legitimate transmissions, and the resulting "collisions" in the system are then detected by an illegitimate jamming receiver. We employ an information theoretic approach to determine upper and lower bounds on the capacity of this jamming-based communication system, under the constraint that jamming does not result in instability of the legitimate user queues. It is intuitively clear that the with such a constraint, the capacity of the jamming channel will converge to zero as the offered load (due to legitimate users) approaches unity. Our bounds verify this intuition, and we show that both the upper and lower bounds converge to zero as the offered load approaches unity. A vast body of literature exists that studies the effect of illegitimate (covert) communication strategies that exploit inherent weaknesses in conventional systems [1] , [2] , and in the context of ALOHA [3] (we refer to [4] , for additional references). Formally, in a top-level characterization of covert channels, Kemmerer [5] states that necessary conditions for the existence of a covert channel are: the presence of a global resource to which both the sender and the receiver have access, a means of modifying that resource, and a method of synchronization between the receiver and the sender.
In this correspondence, our focus is on the fundamental capacity limits of the covert ALOHA channel over the class of all ergodic jamming strategies. We study the information-theoretic capacity of the illegitimate system where two legitimate users communicate over a slotted ALOHA channel, and for any fixed offered load 2 (0; 1), subject to a stability constraint on the legitimate user queues. We first derive achievable jamming rates over the slotted ALOHA channel by considering various independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) jamming strategies, and where the illegitimate user has varying degrees of side-information on the channel state. The generalization to any n>2 is presented, along with more details and proofs for the n = 2 case, in [4] .
We then derive an upper bound on the jamming capacity of this channel over the class of all ergodic undetectable (to be defined) strategies, subject to stability constraint on the legitimate user queues. The dynamics of this system are complex because the jamming strategy of the illegitimate user influences the queueing dynamics of all the legitimate users, thus coupling the source (illegitimate user) and the channel state (the queue lengths of all the users). We also show that this upper bound is tight as the offered load approaches unity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this correspondence, we mainly consider a scenario where two legitimate users and two illegitimate users (Alice and Bob) share the common medium using slotted ALOHA. Alice wishes to transmit to Bob without being detected by the system. Each legitimate user in this slotted ALOHA system is associated with a queue, with i.i.d. Bernoulli packet arrivals to each queue at rate . A slotted ALOHA system with two legitimate users Q 1 and Q 2 is shown in Fig. 1 . We will use Qi, i = 1; 2 to denote both the users and the corresponding length of their queues. When the queue Q i is nonempty, user Q i attempts to transmit in a time-slot with probability p. A time-slot j is said to be active if at least one of the users transmits a packet on the channel.
Collisions naturally occur in this system when both users Q1 and Q 2 attempt transmission. In a regular slotted ALOHA system, such a collision is detected, and the colliding packet is then retransmitted.
We assume that the legitimate users do not care for the packet collisions so long as their buffers do not overflow (i.e., as long as their queues do not become unstable). The legitimate users do not know how many legitimate users use the system, therefore as long as their buffers do not overflow, they consider the collisions natural.
Alice exploits this aspect of the system to communicate while remaining undetected, choosing signals from a binary alphabet f"0"; "1"g. For every "1" that Alice wishes to transmit, she causes a collision by jamming a transmission in the corresponding time-slot. The illegitimate receiver (Bob) interprets each unsuccessful packet transmission as a "1" transmitted by Alice, and each successful transmission by the legitimate users in the system as a "0".
In order for the illegitimate users to remain undetected, Alice should be able to (causally) detect the presence of a legitimate packet on the channel. This can be achieved by carrier sensing or power-level detection. In practice, there exist protocols, e.g., carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) that require the transmitter to sense the carrier signal from other transmitter(s) before starting their own transmission. Further, Alice's jamming strategy must not make the overall system unstable [6] .
Alice's jamming policy is illustrated in (2)
to be the random set of active time-slots; the ! in the definition indicates that this is a random set that depends upon the queue states and the attempt probabilities at each of the legitimate user queues. For ease of notation, we shall drop the ! in subsequent references to this random set.
The active time-slots are indexed by the function t(i) = inffk 1 : jA k j = ig which denotes the time-slot when the channel is active for the i-th time. The illegitimate channel is defined as the jamming channel between Alice and Bob. Note however, that the codewords used by Alice over this jamming channel are only transmitted (and received by Bob) over consecutive t(i)'s.
For the purpose of rigor, assume that whenever the channel is idle, Alice transmits a . Thus, Alice's codewords are strings from the alphabet f0; 1; g. Define S1 as the set of codeword strings of infinite length that Alice can use to jam over the illegitimate channel so that the queues Q1, Q2 are stable and ergodic. Formally, x 1 2 S1 is such that for each (k; l) 2 2 , and each sample path !, the limit
converges to a well-defined probability measure over 2 , where Q1(i), Q 2 (i) denote the queue-lengths at time i. where (a) i is defined as the ith element in vector a.
Formally, let ST be a set of T length strings derived from S1 under the projection operator T so that for all x T 2 S T , 9x 1 2 S 1 , such that x T = T (x 1 ).
Define the (ergodic) information-theoretic hidden capacity over the active time-slots as follows:
where the codeword vector x T = (x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x T ), each xi 2 f0; 1; g transmitted by Alice is received by Bob across the hidden channel as y T .
Recall that we considered the alphabet to denote that Alice does not transmit anything over the timeslot corresponding to since the channel is idle at those timeslots. Bob realizes that the channel is idle and does not expect transmission by Alice. Hence the capacity in (4) is 
where x jA j = (x t(1) ; x t(2) ; . . . ; x t(jA j) ) x t(i) 2 f0; 1g is the effective codeword vector transmitted by Alice and received by Bob as y jA j . We use this definition of capacity in the rest of this correspondence. This capacity is less than one bit per transmission because the channel between Alice and Bob is not ideal. Conditioned on the event that multiple users have packets to transmit and that there is activity in the channel, the hidden channel between Alice and Bob behaves as a Z-channel [7] (see Fig. 3 ). We assume that the illegitimate users know the offered load = pp , wherep = 1 0 p, and the Z-channel crossover probability p c because, if the illegitimate users do not know the offered load and start jamming with probability >0, then there is the possibility that the system becomes unstable and the illegitimate users are exposed.
When only one of the two legitimate users has packets, there are no collisions in the legitimate channel, and the illegitimate channel reduces to an ideal error-free channel. When none of the legitimate users have packets, no transmission is possible.
III. ACHIEVABLE RATES FOR THE HIDDEN CHANNEL: THE TWO-USER CASE

A. Capacity
The hidden channel is source dependent because the jamming strategy modifies the queues Q i , i = 1; 2. It also has memory, and is constrained to ensure that the legitimate system remains stable. Conventional single letter characterizations for capacity (used for discrete memoryless channels) cannot be used in this context and hence a closed form expression in terms of channel parameters is difficult to obtain. The next sections investigate achievable rates for this channel under i.i.d. jamming strategies, and an upper bound is then used to motivate this i.i.d. jamming strategy.
B. I.I.D. Jamming Strategies
We define the following sets S0;2 = f(Q1 = 0; Q2 = 0)g, S1;1 = f(Q 1 ; Q 2 ) : Q 1 = 0; Q 2 > 0g [ f(Q 1 ; Q 2 ) : Q 1 > 0; Q 2 = 0g and S 2;0 = f(Q 1 ; Q 2 ) : Q 1 > 0; Q 2 > 0g. In other words when k of the two queues are backlogged, the process (Q1Q2) is said to be in state S k;20k . When the queue length process (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) 2 S 2;0 and the channel is active, the illegitimate channel reduces to an equivalent Z-channel (see Fig. 3 ), while for states (Q 1 ; Q 2 ) 2 S 1;1 when the channel is active, the illegitimate channel reduces to a zero-error channel.
Let us denote the channel state in a time-slot t by S t . We consider coding/jamming policies described by a map : C 7 ! [0; 1] where C is the set of channel states. Alice then jams (i.e., transmits a "1") a transmission in an active time-slot t(k) when the channel is in state S t(k) 2 C with probability (S t(k) ) independent of all other events.
In other words, given the channel state, Alice uses a codebook that has been generated in an i.i.d. manner. Consequently, the expression for capacity achievable over such i.i.d. strategies follows from (5) 
The queue length process follow a hidden Markov process. The complete transition matrix of this DTMC can be derived to show that the DTMC is aperiodic and positive recurrent for < pp.
Mutual information rates of finite state Markov channels have been studied in [8] for the i.i.d. coding case. A formula for mutual information for any regenerative stochastic process (including, in particular, for hidden Markov inputs over a countable-state space Markov channel) is provided in [9] . However, the formula in [9] can only be numerically computed. In the following subsections, we derive closed-form expressions for each of the cases discussed above.
Coding Strategy 1: The illegitimate users know that the hidden channel is an arbitrarily varying time-varying channel which is composed of a Z-channel (with known crossover probability pc) and an error-free channel. Also, note that to retain the stability of the legitimate user queues and hence remain undetected, Alice has to ensure that no more than a certain fraction of the packet transmissions are jammed. Alice uses a state-independent i.i.d. jamming policy with jamming probability q.
Since the queue length process (Q1; Q2) is a Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), we can solve the global balance equations and sum over the probabilities of the relevant states to arrive at the following steady state invariant probabilities for the illegitimate channel: P (S 0;2 ) = 0;2 = pq 0 pq ppq 0 ppq 0 + p P (S1;1) = 1;1 = 2 1 0 ppq p ppq 0 + p P (S2;0) = 2;0 = 1 0 0;2 0 1;1 (7) whereq = 10 q: Further, with this i.i.d. jamming strategy, the stability constraint leads to the inequality q . We can now calculate from the global balance equations in terms of the offered load = =pp of the queues, and have = 1 0 :
to ensure that the 0 < i;20i < 1 for i 2 0; 1; 2 in (7) .
Hence the state-independent i.i.d. coding strategy for Case 1 is to find the optimal value of q. To obtain an expression for the capacity of this arbitrarily varying channel, we first decompose the channel into two states S1;1 and S2;0 and calculate the channel capacities for a channel fixed at each of these states. Note that we exclude the state S 0;2 since there are no active time-slots in when the channel is in this state. Proof: See [4] .
Coding Strategy 2:
The illegitimate users know that the offered load is = pp , wherep = 1 0 p, and the Z-channel crossover probability is p c . Since the Z-channel crossover probability is given by pc = p 2 1 0p 2 = p 2 0 p (10) the illegitimate users can compute p = 2p c 1 + p c :
Also, since = p(1 0 p), the illegitimate users can compute , the arrival rate for the user queues Q i . Proof: See [4] .
Remark: Coding strategy 2 is better than coding strategy 1. Achievable Rate in Presence of Side Information: Consider a coding scheme where Alice uses separate codebooks for each channel state.
Let the probability of Alice transmitting a "1" in state S2;0 be q as before, while the probability of Alice transmitting a "1" in state S 1;1 be w. Finally, Alice does not transmit in the inactive queue state of S0;2. That is, for each active time-slot t(k), (S t(k) ) = q; if S t(k) = S 2;0 w; if S t(k) = S1;1 :
Using the same arguments as in Section III, steady-state probabilities of the queues ( 0;2 ; 1;1 ; 2;0 ) can be calculated (see [4] ). Then the hidden rate can be simply seen to be the sum of the rates of the Z-channel and the zero-error channel weighted by the probabilities that the illegitimate channel is in these states. The rate can then be maximized over possible values of q and w so as to retain the stability of the steady-state queue lengths at the legitimate users as follows. 2;0(1 0p 2 )Rz(q; pc) + 1;1 pH(w)g : (14) Proof: See [4] .
IV. UPPER BOUND ON HIDDEN CAPACITY: THE TWO USER CASE
We derive an outer bound on the hidden capacity of this system over the set of all ergodic jamming policies that Alice may employ. To obtain an upper bound, we first decouple the state of the illegitimate channel from the coding strategy by considering a virtual parallel channel. We then prove that the capacity of this virtual illegitimate channel is always greater than that of the true illegitimate channel and then bound it as a weighted sum of the capacities of a Z-channel and a rate 1, error free channel. 2 ) between Cindy and Doug, defined as a stationary and ergodic process, so that (Q 3 1 ; Q 3 2 ) = (Q 1 ; Q 2 ). In other words, for every legitimate packet transmitted over the true channel, there is a virtual packet transmitted over the virtual channel. However, Cindy's transmit policy (jamming/not jamming any active time-slot) does not affect the dynamics of the queues.
Note that as all of Alice's strategies are valid jamming strategies for Cindy, the capacity of the Cindy-Doug channel is at least that of the Alice-Bob channel.
Note that, although the set of codewords Alice could use might span across different states in general, the ergodicity constraint on the optimal policy implies that the fraction of time-slots jammed by Alice in each state S i;20i converges to a constant 3 i;20i defined as where Ifg is the indicator function and as before, S t denotes the channel state at time-slot t. Consequently, we will apply the same codeword weight constraint 3 i;20i to the state-dependent code that Cindy uses as well to communicate over the virtual channel at each state Si;20i.
Further, note that given queue state information, the Cindy-Doug illegitimate channel is a discrete memoryless time-varying channel with state side information at transmitter and receiver.
Consider a (2 nR ; n) codeX n = fxi(w)g n 1 over the ternary alphabet f0; 1;g transmitted over this channel with source alphabet W corresponding to a state sequence (trajectory) S n = fS i g n 1 , S i 2 fS k;20k ; k 2 f0; 1; 2gg and received sequenceŶ n = fyi(w)g n 1 .
Then following [10] , we can define C c to be the capacity of the Cindy-Doug channel and C i;20i ( 3 i;20i 
Using the stability of the system as well as further upper bounds on the parameters of the system, the expression in (19) can be shown to simplify and to be less than or equal to that in (15). A more detailed version of this proof can be found in [4] .
We present numerical results for the achievable bound and compare it against the upper bound in Fig. 4 . The upper bound is loose everywhere except at values of very close to 1. Observe that the bound is asymptotically tight in the sense that as the offered load ! 1, both the upper bound and the achievable rate tend to 0.
The more general n > 2 case is left out of this correspondence and can be found in [4] .
V. CONCLUSION
The setting studied in this correspondence is of two illegitimate users-a transmitter and a receiver, communicating with each other by exploiting the resources of a slotted ALOHA system. The illegitimate pair communicate by jamming legitimate transmissions while striving to remain undetected by the legitimate slotted ALOHA system. In this correspondence, we find lower and upper bounds on capacity. We employ i.i.d. coding strategies under varying side-information assumptions to determine lower bounds. We employ constrained decoupling arguments to determine upper bounds, and finally, we compare the upper and lower bounds. We find that, in the limit when the offered load tends to unity (and the capacity to zero), our upper and lower bounds coincide.
